Container defense system

ABSTRACT

A container includes multiple panels defining an interior volume, with a first panel including a composite material. A first beam detector element positioned within the interior volume detects a directed radiation scan beam that includes a modulated query message. Also positioned within the interior volume are a security element to detect an intrusion and an identification element communicatively coupled to the first beam detector element to store an identity of the container and to produce a query response message without breaking a seal of the container. A transmitter element is coupled to the identification element to transmit a response message to a receiver unit. The beam enters the inter volume along a path directed through the first panel, across a portion of the interior volume and onto the first beam detector element allowing for determination of a material property of contents of the interior volume.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION(S)

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.12/596,971, filed Jul. 7, 2010 by Fred Hewitt Smith, and entitled“Container Defense System,” which is a U.S. National Stage ofInternational Application No. PCT/2008/001350, filed Feb. 1, 2008, whichclaims the benefit of priority to U.S. Provisional Application No.60/899,275 filed on Feb. 1, 2007, all of which are hereby incorporatedherein by reference in their entirety.

SUMMARY

The inventors have realized that a system featuring low power,inexpensive scanners may be used to scan composite containers for thepresence of nuclear weapons and certify the containers for futureshipping.

In one aspect, a system for scanning and securing a container includinga plurality of at least partially composite panels defining an interiorvolume is disclosed, the system including: a remote control unit; areceiver unit in communication with the remote control unit; a scannerincluding a beam generator adapted to emit a directed radiation scanbeam and a detector adapted to detect the scan beam, the scanner inremote communication with the remote control unit; a beam detectorelement positioned within the container adapted to detect the scan beam;an intrusion detection system positioned within the container adapted todetect an intrusion into the container; an identification elementpositioned within the container and adapted to store identityinformation indicative of the identity of the container; a transmitterelement positioned within the at least one container The e beamgenerator is adapted to direct the scan beam along a path into theinterior volume of the container through one of the plurality of atleast partially composite panels, across a portion of the interiorvolume, out of the interior volume through one of the plurality of atleast partially composite panels, and onto the scan beam detector andthe scanner is adapted to determine material property informationindicative of the material properties of contents of the interior volumebased on the detected beam. The scanner is adapted to modulate a querymessage from the remote control unit onto the scan beam, and the beamdetector element is adapted to demodulate the message. Theidentification element is adapted produce a response message based onthe demodulated query message and the stored identity information. Thetransmitter element is adapted to transmit the response message to thereceiver unit.

In some embodiments, the remote control unit is adapted to receive theresponse message from the receiver unit and verify the identity of thecontainer based on the verification response message. In someembodiments, the query message includes a number generated randomly bythe remote control unit.

In some embodiments the remote control unit is adapted to determine thepresence or absence of a nuclear device within the container based onthe material property information and, if no nuclear device isdetermined to be present, store a certificate associated with thecontainer. In some embodiments, the scanner is located in proximity tothe receiver unit.

Some embodiments include: a dosimeter positioned within the at least onecontainer, the dosimeter including a radon detection element adapted todetect a radon level for the interior volume; and a neutron detectionelement adapted to detect a neutron level for the interior volume. Thedosimeter is adapted to measure the radon level and neutron level for aperiod of time, compare the measured radon level to a first threshold,compare the measured neutron level to a second threshold, determinedosimeter information indicative of the presence or absence of fissilematerial within the interior volume based on the comparisons, andcommunicate the dosimeter information to one or more of theidentification element, the transmitter element, the receiver element,and the beam detector element.

In some embodiments, the identification element is adapted to destroy aportion of the stored identification information in response to anintrusion detected by the security element.

In some embodiments, the identification element is adapted to destroy aportion of the stored identification information in response to adetection of fissile material within the container by the dosimeter.

Some embodiments include a verification unit including a verificationscanner including a beam generator adapted to emit a directed radiationverification scan beam; and a verification receiver unit located inproximity to the verification scanner unit. The verification scannerunit is adapted to modulate a verification query message received fromthe remote control unit onto the verification scan beam, and direct theverification scan beam to the beam detector element located within thecontainer. The beam detector element is adapted to detect theverification scan beam and demodulate the verification query message.The identification is adapted produce a verification response messagebased on the demodulated verification query message and the storedidentity information. The transmitter element is adapted to transmit averification response message to the receiver unit. The remote controlunit is adapted to receive the verification response message from thereceiver unit and verify the identity of the container based on theverification response message.

Some embodiments include a loading device in communication with theremote control unit and located in proximity the verification unit, theloading device adapted to selectively load the at least one containeronto a transport (e.g. a ship, train or truck) based on the verificationof the and the of the certificate associated with the identity of thecontainer.

In some embodiments, the identification element stores privateidentification information which cannot be transmitted to any scanner orreceiver located outside the container.

In some embodiments, the security element includes a sensor gridembedded in one or more of the plurality of at least partially compositepanels.

In some embodiments, the container includes a sealed container having asubstantially air tight interior volume, and the security elementincludes a radon detector unit adapted to: detect the change in radonlevel in the interior volume of the sealed container; compare thedetected change to an expected change value based on the four day halflife of radon; and indicate the presence or absence of an intrusion intothe sealed container based on the comparison.

Some embodiments include a first scanner adapted to produce a relativelylow energy directed radiation scan beam; a second scanner adapted toproduce a relatively high energy directed radiation scan beam; and asorting module adapted to direct containers represented to containsubstantially no metal material to the first scanner and to directcontainers represented to contain metal material to the second scanner.The first scanner is adapted to receive a container represented tocontain substantially no metal material from the sorting module, and toscan the container to verify that substantially no material is presentinside the container. The second scanner is adapted to receive acontainer represented to contain metal material from the sorting module,and to scan the container to detect the presence of a nuclear device.Some such embodiments also include a third scanner adapted to produce arelatively moderate energy directed radiation scan beam. The sortingmodule is adapted direct containers represented to contain metalmaterial which has a density above a threshold value to the secondscanner, and to direct containers represented to contain metal materialconsisting only of metal material having a density below the thresholdvalue to the third container. The third scanner is adapted to receive acontainer represented to contain metal material consisting only of metalmaterial having a density below the threshold value from the sortingmodule, and to scan the container to verify that substantially nomaterial is present inside the container having a density above thethreshold value.

In some embodiments, the scanner and the receiver unit each include aninformation security element adapted to prevent access to data stored inthe scanner and the receiver unit by an entity other than the remotecontrol unit.

In another aspect, a method for scanning and securing a containerincluding a plurality of at least partially composite panels defining aninterior volume is disclosed, the method including: storing uniqueidentification information in an identification element withincontainer; sealing the container; monitoring the container forintrusion; without breaching the seal of the container, remotelyidentifying the container based on the unique identity informationwithout breaching the seal of the container; without breaching the sealof the container; scanning the identified container to determine thepresence or absence of a nuclear weapon in the interior volume; and ifthe scan determines no nuclear weapon is present, remotely storingcertificate information associated with the identity of the container ina remote monitor unit.

In some embodiments, the storing unique identification information in anidentification element within container includes: at a secure trustedlocation, providing identification information to be stored in theidentification element positioned within the container, theidentification information including a public ID portion and acorresponding secret ID portion, and storing a copy of the public ID andthe private ID in the remote monitor unit.

In some embodiments, remotely identifying the container includes: at afirst location, providing the remote monitor unit; at a second locationproviding a scanning unit in communication with the remote monitor unit,the scanning unit adapted to communicate with the identification elementwithin the container without breaching the seal of the container;generating query information at the remote monitor unit; transmittingthe query information to the remote scanning unit; without breaching theseal of the container transmitting the query information from the remotemonitor to the identification element; at the identification element,using a hash algorithm to hash the query information with the private IDto produce response hash information; in response to the queryinformation, without breaching the seal of the container, transmittingthe public ID stored in the identification element and the response hashinformation to the scanning unit transmitting the public ID stored inthe identification element and the response hash information from thescanning unit to the remote monitor unit; and at the remote monitorunit: identifying the private ID corresponding the public ID receivedfrom the scanning unit; using the hash algorithm to hash the queryinformation with the identified private ID to produce verification hashinformation; comparing the response hash information to the verificationhash information to verify the identity of the container.

Some embodiments include, in response to an intrusion of the container,modifying or destroying at least a portion of the identificationinformation.

In some embodiments, the scanning includes: generating a directedradiation scan beam having a beam energy sufficient to penetrate throughat least one of the plurality of composite panels but insufficient topenetrate through bulk metal material; directing the scan beam along apath into the interior volume of the container through one of theplurality of at least partially composite panels, across a portion ofthe interior volume, out of the interior volume through one of theplurality of composite panels, and onto a scan beam detector; detectingthe scan beam with the scan beam detector, analyzing the detected beamto determine information indicative of the material properties ofcontents of the interior volume based on the detected beam; andoutputting the information indicative of the material properties ofcontents of the interior volume.

Some embodiments include using a dosimeter positioned within thecontainer to measure the radon level and the neutron level in theinterior volume over a period of time, detecting the presence or absenceof fissile material within the interior volume based on the measuredradon level and neutral level; in response to a detection of fissilematerial, destroying a portion of the identification information storedin the identification element.

Some embodiments include monitoring the container for an indication ofan imminent nuclear explosion, and in response to a detection of animminent nuclear explosion, transmitting a message including informationindicative of the identity of the container.

Various embodiments may include any of the above described features,alone or in any combination. These and other features will be more fullyappreciated with reference to the following detailed description whichis to be read in conjunction with the attached drawings.

In is to be understood that, as used herein, the term “detecting a beam”and related terms refer to detecting any property of a beam of radiation(e.g. an x-ray beam) including, but not limited to: intensity, fluence,cross section, wavelength, pulse duration, etc. Further, it is to beunderstood that detecting a beam may include detecting the interruptionor blocking of a beam (e.g. when an x-ray beam is blocked by metallicmaterial positioned between the beam source and the detector).

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The foregoing and other objects of this disclosure, the various featuresthereof, may be more fully understood from the following description,when read together with the accompanying drawings in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates a prior art container scanning system;

FIG. 2 illustrates a system for scanning and certifying containers;

FIGS. 3-6 illustrate potential attacks on a system for scanning andcertifying containers;

FIG. 7 shows a perspective view of a container and a scanning system;

FIG. 8 illustrates a scanning pattern on a container panel;

FIG. 9 illustrates a triage and scanning system;

FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing a dosimeter installed in a container;

FIG. 11 illustrates a scanning system for use with a dosimeter installedin a container;

FIG. 12 a perspective view of a dosimeter installed in a container and ascanning system;

FIG. 13 shows a perspective view of a container with composite plugs anda scanning system;

FIG. 14 shows a perspective view of a container with composite plugs anda scanning system;

FIG. 15 is a block diagram of a remotely controlled scanning system andcontainer with composite plug;

FIG. 16 shows a top down view of a container with composite plugs and afabric liner containing intrusion detection grids;

FIG. 17 is a schematic diagram illustrating an exemplary structuralmember including dispersed, interconnected electronic components;

FIG. 18 is a schematic diagram illustrating interconnection of multiplestructural members of FIG. 17; and

FIG. 19 is a block diagram illustrating in more detail an exemplary oneof the electronic components of FIG. 17.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The following discloses a system 10 for scanning shipping containers(e.g. maritime containers) for the presence of a concealed nuclearweapon before the container is loaded onto transport, e.g. a ship boundfor the US from a foreign nation. System 10 is an inexpensive automateddefense which will allow commerce to flow rapidly. An inexpensiveautomated defense can be widely deployed, with the result that it maybecome financially and operationally feasible to scan 100% of containersentering the US.

FIG. 1 depicts the current scanning methods, where many containers 12line up to pass through a very expensive high power x-ray scanner 14.Numerous on-site operators 16 are required and they must be trusted inorder for the system to work. This method is so slow and so expensivethat most containers 12 are not scanned, even though 100% scanning ofinbound containers will be required a few years from now, according torecent federal legislation. The scanning operation has to be close toloading crane 18, since there is no procedure except physical control toassure that the container is not breached after scanning and prior toloading.

Referring to FIG. 2, system 10 is a system for scanning shippingcontainers 20. System 10 includes one or more scanning lanes 22. Remotemonitor unit 24 is in communication with scan lane 22 over the internet26 (or other suitable communication link or network).

Container 20 is constructed from multiple panels defining an interiorvolume. The panels may be entirely or partially constructed fromcomposite material which has relatively high transmissivity to x-rayradiation compared to conventional container panel materials (e.g.steel).

Container 20 includes a security element 27 which monitors the containerfor breach or intrusion. For example, as described in detail below, oneor more of the panels of container 10 may be composite panels embeddedwith a multitude of electrically or optically interconnected sensorswhich can detect a breach in the panel.

Scanner 28 includes beam generator 30 which transmits a directedradiation scan beam 32 (e.g. an x-ray beam) along a path through acomposite portion of a sidewall of container 20, across a portion of theinterior volume, and out through a composite portion of the opposingsidewall and onto scan beam detector 34 position the other side of thecontainer.

Because scan beam 32 is directed through composite portions of container10 having relatively high transmissivity, beam generator 30 may haverelatively low power (and hence low cost) beam source. As described indetail below, signals from scan beam detector 34 may be analyzed todetermine information about the material properties of cargo (not shown)located in the interior volume of container 10. For example, blockage ofthe beam might indicate the presence of dense material such as metal.Using the techniques described below, scanner 28 can operate to scan theentire contents of container 10 to determine the presence of a nuclearweapon.

Scanner 28 is in communication with remote monitor unit 24. Signals fromscan beam detector 34 and/or analyzed data indicating, e.g., thepresence or absence of a nuclear weapon within container 10 may betransmitted to remote monitor unit 24. Scanner 28 can operate tomodulate a message received from the remote monitor unit onto scan beam32.

Scan beam detector/demodulator located inside container 10 can detectscan beam 32 and demodulate a message modulated onto the beam. In someembodiments, detector/demodulator 36 may also function to modulateadditional messages onto scan beam 36 which can be detected anddemodulated by scan beam detector 34 after scan beam 32 exits container20. In this fashion, a one or two way directed beam communication linkmay be established with detector/demodulator 36.

Detector/demodulator 36 is in communication with identification element38 which includes an electronic memory capable of, as described in moredetail below, storing information including electronic IDs and otherdata. Identification element 38 may also include a processor capable ofprocessing the stored data. Identification element 38 also includes anon-directed wave transmitter (e.g. a radio transmitter, RF transmitter,Bluetooth antenna, etc.) which transmits messages based on the storeddata. Identification element 38 is also in communication with securityelement 27, which, upon detecting a breach of container 10, may causeidentification element 38 to modify or destroy the stored electronic IDand/or other data.

Receiver 40, positioned in or near scanning lane 22, can receive thenon-directed transmissions from identification element 38. For example,receiver 40 may be a laptop or personal computer. Receiver 40 is incommunication with remote monitor unit 24 via the internet 26.

Dosimeter 39 is positioned inside container 10, and may be incommunication with one or more of identification element 38, securityelement 27, and detector/demodulator element 36. As described in detailbelow, dosimeter 39 can detect the presence of even lead shieldedfissile material located inside container 20. In some embodiments, iffissile material is detected, dosimeter 39 can produce an alarm whichcauses cause identification element 38 to modify or destroy the storedelectronic ID, certificates, and/or other data.

Explosion detector 41 is positioned inside container 20, and operates todetect the presence of an imminent nuclear explosion (e.g. by detectingx-rays, gamma rays, neutrons, thermal emissions, etc.). Explosiondetector 41 can transmit a warning message which includes informationindicating the identity of the container. Thus, in the event of a systemfailure leading to a nuclear explosion, the source of the explosion canbe more easily tracked.

The following will describe how system 10 will scan container 20 for thepresence of a nuclear weapon, and present the container with acertificate certifying that it has been scanned. As described below,such a certificate can be secured so that it can be trusted whenpresented at a later time and position, e.g., at the loading crane whichloads container 10 onto a transport.

Container 10 is driven into scanning lane 20 analogous to the lanes in ahighway toll booth. Scanner 20 modulates a query message onto scan beam32 which is detected and demodulated by detector/demodulator element 36.In response to the demodulated query message, identification element 38transmits a response message including stored identity data viaBluetooth to receiver 40, which passes the response message via theInternet to remote monitor unit 24.

Remote monitor unit 24 generates a token (e.g. a random number) andsends it to scanner 28. Scanner 28 modulates the token over scan beam32. Detector/demodulator 36 detects the scan beam, demodulates the tokenfrom the beam, and communicates the token to identification element 38,which sends the token back to receiver 40 via Bluetooth. Receiver 40sends the token via the Internet back to the remote monitor.

After the transmission and receipt of the token described above, remotemonitor unit 24 can verify (e.g. using a look up list of electronic IDsinstalled in various containers at a secure production facility) thatthe container associated with the electronic ID produced byidentification element 38 is in fact container 10 which is physicallypresent in lane 20 in front of scanner 28. This assurance permits secureremote management of the scan itself.

Using the techniques described herein, scanner 28 scans container 20 forthe presence of a nuclear weapon. If the container passes the scan,scanner 28 sends a certificate to remote monitor unit 24, which storesit. This certificate associates the container's ID with the fact thatthe container passed the scan. In some embodiments, dosimetercommunicates information regarding the presence of fissile material withscanner 28 and receiver 40, which may be passed on to remote monitorunit 24. The issuance of the certificate may be based on thisinformation.

After leaving scanning lane 20, when the container is presented forloading by the loading crane, one need only obtain the ID of thecontainer, communicate with the remote monitor, and determine if thiscontainer has been issued a certificate certifying that it has passed ascan.

For example, a loading crane may pick up container 10. Through a PCbuilt into the loading crane, remote monitor 24 communicates withidentification element 38 in the container to obtain electronic IDinformation, determines whether the ID is valid and whether a scanningcertificate has been issued. If the ID is valid and there is a scanningcertificate, the remote monitor instructs the loading crane to load thecontainer on board the ship. In typical applications, this entireprocedure takes less than a second. If there is an invalid ID or nocertificate, the crane would deposit the container in a secure area forcontainers that need to be examined by the proper authorities. Theprocess of how the validity of an ID is determined is described indetail below.

Identification element 38 stores a public and a private ID. In responseto a query (e.g. modulated over a scan beam and demodulated bydetector/demodulator element 36), identification element 38 sends apublic ID to remote monitor unit 24, e.g. via a Bluetooth receiverlinked via the internet to the monitor. Remote monitor unit 24 thengenerates a question, which it sends to identification element 38 (e.g.via a scan beam). The identification element 38 transmits an answer tothe question which is received and returned to remote monitor unit 24.The question remote monitor unit 24 sends is a randomly generated number(e.g. a 32 bit number). Using a hash algorithm of the type familiar tothose in the art, identification element 38 prepares a response hash ofthis number and the stored hidden ID, and returns this response hashvalue, the answer, to remote monitor unit 24. Using the same algorithm,remote monitor unit 24 prepares a verification hash of its copy of thehidden ID associated with the public ID presented by identificationelement 38. If the response and verification hashes are identical, theprobability that identification element 38 locate in container 10 doesnot contain the correct hidden ID is near zero. Note that, since thequestion is generated randomly, identification element 38 is almostcertainly never asked the same question twice. If container 10 is askedthe same question twice, identification element 38 will realize this,and will alarm. Only an identification element 38 that has the correcthidden ID will answer these randomly generated questions with the answerthat is correct for a particular question.

Using the presented public ID, remote monitor unit 24 can look up theprivate ID that the identification element 38 should possess. Using thequestion, the answer, and the correct private ID stored with the remotemonitor, the remote monitor can determine whether identification element38 actually does possess this ID. Using this type of procedure, remotemonitor unit 38 can determine whether identification element 38possesses a certain ID without ever having to transmit the secretportion of the ID outside identification element 38.

As described above, security element 27 and dosimeter 39 may operate tomodify or destroy the hidden ID in response to detection ofintrusion/tampering and the presence of fissile material, respectively.Accordingly, the identification process described above can also be usedto identify containers subject to tamper or containing hidden fissilematerial.

The above described procedure for testing the secret ID is used bothduring the scanning of container 20 in scan lane 22 and when thecontainer is presented for loading.

Referring again to FIG. 2, container 20 should pass a scan and be issueda certificate if (a) no dense metal is detected; (b) the container has avalid ID; and (c) dosimeter 39 does not detected hidden fissilematerials

About one third of all in-bound US containers will contain dense metal,and so for these containers, condition (a) will not be met. For thesecontainers it is possible to issue a certificate on the basis ofconditions (b) and (c). In other words if dosimeter 39 has not detectedfissile material and the container has a valid ID, the container shouldbe issued a certificate for loading.

There are many reasons why container 20 would not have a valid ID. Onereason is that the container had never been issued at ID. Issuance ofIDs is discussed below. Another reason that container 20 would not havea valid ID would be detection of some type of an alarm condition. Whenan alarm condition is detected, identification element 38 destroys partof the ID so that the container cannot thereafter present a valid ID.Alarm condition could include a breach through the sides of a containerdetected by security element 27, an attempt to reverse engineeridentification element 38, detection of fissile material by dosimeter39; detection of an air change by dosimeter 39 (described in detailbelow).

The following describes various possible attacks against the system 10,and how system 10 defeats the threat. FIG. 3 illustrates a threatpresented when a container 20 which has never been scanned is presentedfor loading at crane 52. Following the procedures described above, whencontainer 20 arrives at the loading dock crane 52, remote monitor 24(not shown), using a scanner located at or near crane 52, attempts tocommunicate with the identification element which should be inside. Ifthe remote monitor cannot do this, the container is not loaded.

If remote monitor unit 24 can communicate with an identification elementin container 20, remote monitor 24 will check to determine if the IDstored in the identification element is valid. If the ID is valid,remote monitor 24 will verify that a container with this ID has beenscanned (e.g. by searching for a certificate associated with thecontainer). In the illustrated threat in this section, the container hasnot been scanned, there will be no certificate, and container 20 willnot be loaded.

FIG. 4 illustrates an attack, whereby after container 20 has passed ascan and been issued a certificate, but before being presented forloading at crane 52, an adversary breaks into container 20 and inserts anuclear weapon. The defense involves detecting the attack, and upondetection destroying part of the hidden ID in identification element 38.If the data including the hidden ID is destroyed, identification element38 will not be able to correctly answer the question posed by remotemonitor 24, and the container will not be loaded.

As discussed in detail below, security element 27 can detect a breachthrough the walls of the container. Security element 27 is connected toidentification element 38. When the identification element 38 is alertedthat the container has been breached, it destroys a part of the privateID as described above. When container 20 is later presented for loadingat crane 52, the container will not pass a question and answerinterrogation. This will mean that something is wrong and the containershould not be loaded.

In some embodiments, identification element 38 consists of a circuitembedded into a composite material. This circuit contains numerouselectronic elements which store the values which make up the ID.Destroying one of these elements will cause the identification element38 to fail the question and answer dialogue with remote monitor 24.

When identification element 38 destroys part of the ID by destroying anelectronic element, it does not merely electronically erase theinformation from the element, but chemically or thermally destroys theelement so that the element can never be made to reveal its priorcontents. An adversary with advanced technology can sometimes recover anumber which has been erased using simple electronic methods. Acomposite material is superior to silicon as a substrate for anelectronic circuit, because data destruction functionality is difficultto implement in silicon.

FIG. 5 illustrates the threat of spoofing attack. For this attack anadversary produces two containers 20A and 20B each including anidentification element 38 storing the same ID. Container 20A is scannedand contains no harmful material. Container 20B has the nuclear weaponand is not scanned. Container 20B is then presented to loading crane 52.Since both containers have the same ID, the loading crane 52 believescontainer 20B is container 20A. An adversary can practice this attackwith harmless merchandise. When the adversary is certain that thespoofing operation works properly, the adversary can commit a nuclearweapon to the importation process with low risk that the weapon will bediscovered and lost and that an alarm will be sounded.

System 10 defends against this threat by assuring that no two containerscan have the same ID and that an adversary cannot discover the ID of thecontainer. An ID embedded in a silicon chip can be discovered by asophisticated adversary using the Focused Ion Beam System (FIBS) whichtakes a silicon chip apart molecule by molecule. FIBS reverseengineering services are readily available on the market.

In some embodiments, identification element 38 represents a defenseagainst FIBS. Identification element 38 may be a circuit embedded notinto silicon but into composite material whereby the elements are widelydispersed and continuously check on one another. When attack is sensed,identification element 38 permanently destroys various elements of theID by burning or chemical methods so that the previous value of theelement cannot be recovered, even by a sophisticated adversary.

Also, as previously described above, the identification element 38 usesa question and answer procedure whereby the presence of a particular IDcan be remotely detected without ever having to send the ID itself overthe internet or other long distance public channel.

FIG. 6 illustrates an attack where an adversary attempts to fool thescanner so that one container 20A is scanned whereas another container20B provides the ID. System 10 defends against this threat using theclosed loop identification techniques described herein to verify thatthe container in communication with remote monitor 24 is actuallylocated in the appropriate scan lane 22 in front of scanner 28

In such techniques, information is exchanged over a directed X-ray ormicrowave or other wave by modulating and demodulating the informationusing well-known technology. Of course this exchange of information maybe encrypted. A sophisticated adversary could possibly intercept theexchanged information and defeat the protection using a variation of theman-in-the-middle attack, whereby the scanner believes it iscommunicating with the container, and the container believes it iscommunicating with the scanner, but in fact both are communicating withan adversary that has been interposed between them. System 10 may employmethods to detect a man-in-the-middle attack known in the art.

Attacks involving placing a hidden shielded nuclear weapon in container20 may be defeated by system 10 by employing a dosimeter of the typedescribed in detail below.

There is a possibility an adversary could attempt to discover the IDembedded in identification element 38 by bribing or intimidatingemployees in the factory where the ID is installed.

When the ID is installed in identification element 38 in container 20,it is generated by remote monitor 24 and transferred over the Internetto the factory for installation into identification element 38. This isthe only occasion when the ID travels over the Internet and when itexposed outside the remote monitor.

As described above, after this time, the remote monitor queriesidentification element 38 to determine if the element has a particularID, but this procedure does not involving actually communicating the IDoutside of identification element 38.

For the initial transfer, the ID is encrypted using secure methodsinvolving asymmetric and symmetric encryption methods. Under thisprocedure, identification element 38 will generate an asymmetricpublic/private key pair, send the public key to the remote monitor,which generates a symmetric key and encrypts that key with the publickey, and returns the encrypted symmetric key to the identificationelement 38, which uses the private key to decrypt the symmetric key. Thesymmetric key is now used to encrypt the ID elements.

Using the above technique, system 10 can protect the ID elements whenthey are installed at the factory. The factory manufacturingidentification element 38 itself would also be physically secure andcould be located inside the United States.

There is a possibility that an adversary could bribe or intimate atrusted employee working at a remote site (e.g. scan lane 22) so as toobtain container IDs. This employee might be so trusted that theemployee was given “root” or administrative access, meaning the employeewas authorized to perform system maintenance tasks. To avoid this,security techniques may be employed to prevent access to critical data,including for example, limiting the availability of certain sensitiveoperating system functions and/or deleting, modifying, or destroying thecritical data when the use of certain sensitive operating systemfunctions are detected.

In various embodiments, system 10 may feature any of the followingelements and techniques, alone or in combination.

Composite Container Scanner and Triage System

Referring to FIG. 7, container 100 is constructed from composite panels102 enclosing an interior volume. Scanner 106 includes directedradiation beam emitter source 108 which produces scan beam 110. Scanbeam 110 is directed along a path which travels through a side panel 102of container 100 into the interior volume, across a portion of theinterior volume, out of opposing side panel 102, and onto detector 112.Scanner 106 includes directed x-ray beam emitters 108. A detector signalfrom detector 112 is transmitted to a remote control unit (not shown),and analyzed to determine the material properties of cargo (not shown)loaded in the interior volume of container 100. For example, thedetector signals can be analyzed to determine the presence of metals,fissile material, medium density material (e.g. electronic components),etc. In some embodiments detector 110 may be in communication with alocal analyzer, such as a personal computer or laptop.

In the illustrated embodiment, where container 100 is a rectangularparallelpiped, scan beams 110 and their respective emitters 108 anddetectors 112 are along axes parallel to one of the sidewalls ofcontainer 100. In some embodiments, beams 110 and their respectiveemitters 108 and detectors 112 may be angularly offset with respect tothe container sidewall.

Because panels 102 are made of composite material having relatively hightransmissivity (e.g. in comparison to metal, such as steel), scan beam110 need not be a high energy beam. Accordingly emitter 108 may be aninexpensive, relatively low power beam emitter. For example, emitter 108may have sufficient power to penetrate composite panels 102 and lowdensity, non-metal cargo loaded into the interior volume of container100, but insufficient power to penetrate dense, bulk metal (e.g. steel,lead, fissile material) etc. In such a case, an interruption of scanbeam 110 measured by detector 112 would indicate the presence of densemetal material in the interior volume.

In various embodiments, emitter 108 may be low-voltage x-ray source(e.g. a 200 kV or less x-ray source) or a cobalt-60 x-ray source. Ascanner including such a source could be manufactured at a cost of about$10,000 or less. In contrast, to generate a scan beam with sufficientenergy to penetrate a steel container would require a high voltage x-raysource operating at 3000 kV or more.

Container 100 can be moved relative to scanner 108 and detector 112(e.g. by driving a truck hauling the container past scanner 106) toallow scan beam 110 to be directed through additional points on sidepanel 102 such that additional portions of the interior volume arescanned. Alternatively, scanner 108 and detector 112 may be movedrelative to container 100 to scan different portions of the interiorvolume. For example, referring to FIG. 8, a scan could sample datapoints for scan beams directed through points 150 on side panel 102located every six inches vertically and horizontally. For example, for a20 foot by 5 foot panel a total of (40*10)=400 data points might besampled, with each data point indicating the presence or absence ofmetal along the scan beam passing through a given point. The results ofthis scan may be analyzed and compared to a threshold to determine thepresence of, for example, a nuclear device. For example, if less than 30of the 400 data points in the example above showed the presence ofmetal, it may be determined that the container does not contain anuclear weapon with a probability of error of 1 part in 1 trillion. The400 point data sample will be compressible into a computer file size of40 bytes, allowing easy storage or transmission to, for example, aremote monitoring or control unit.

In some embodiments, scanner 106 may contain multiple emitters: 108which may produce multiple scan beams 110 simultaneously orsequentially. As described in greater detail below, in some embodimentsonly select portions of one or more of panels 102 of container 100consist of composites with the remainder being made up of metal (e.g.steel). The composite portions allow scan beam 110 to access theinterior volume of the container.

As will be discussed in greater detail below, in some embodiments it ispossible to place a detector inside a shipping container 100 that coulddetect a scan beam 110. With an appropriate detector, messages could bemodulated over the scan beam and demodulated by the detector, so thatthe scanner could communicate with the detector inside the container.Such communication capability could be useful for a remote monitor tocommunicate (e.g. using wireless, radio, or Bluetooth links) with asensor or identification elements inside the container and also tocommunicate with the same container over the scan beam. This would allowremote assurance that the container in front of the scanner was the samecontainer that was in communication with the remote monitor.

Approximately 66% of container traffic inbound to the West Coast of theUS is volume limited. Of this traffic, half contains no metal (i.e.clothing and shoes), a quarter contains electronic parts and games, andthe remainder contains other goods such that a full 20 ft. containerweighs less than the maximum weight of 67,200 lbs. A scanner slightlymore powerful than the type of scanner discussed above could be builtthat would penetrate a cargo consisting of light electronic goods butwould be blocked by dense metal. A nuclear weapon will contain densemetal, even if not shielded with lead. If shielded with lead, it will beeven denser. Consequently, 33% of the inbound West Coast Cargo trafficcould be scanned with an inexpensive scanner and declared not to containmetal, provided the cargo were transported in a composite container. Onthe assumption that if a container does not contain metal, it does notcontain a nuclear weapon, 33% of the inbound container traffic to theWest Coast can be inexpensively scanned and declared safe.

In the following, an exemplary scanning and triage system is disclosedfor efficiently scanning multiple at least partially compositecontainers for the presence of a hidden nuclear device.

Referring to FIG. 9, system 500 includes one or more low power scanners502 having a scan beam with insufficient energy to penetrate densemetals or medium density partially metallic material (e.g. electroniccomponents). The system also includes one or more medium power scanners504 having a scan beam with insufficient energy to penetrate densemetals but sufficient energy to penetrate medium density partiallymetallic material (e.g. electronic components). The system also includesone or more high power scanners 506 having a scan beam with sufficientenergy to penetrate dense metals.

Any of scanners 502, 504, 506 could be coupled with a data collectionprogram on a lap top or remote monitoring unit which analyzes scan datausing one or more of the techniques described above to determineinformation about the content of the containers.

Containers 508 that are represented as containing non-metallic lowdensity material such as clothing are directed to low power scanners502. Containers 508 which pass this scan (i.e. if no metal is detectedin the container) are declared not to contain a nuclear weapon. Thesecontainers would not have to be scanned by a more powerful and moreexpensive scanner. Approximately one third of in-bound container trafficin the U.S. is of this type. This will save money in scanning equipmentand delay.

Containers 510 that are represented as containing electronic componentsor other medium density cargo are directed to the medium power scanners506 suitable for this type of cargo. Containers 510 which pass this scan(i.e. if no metal having a density greater than that typical of mediumdensity cargo is detected) are declared not to contain a nuclear weapon.These containers would not have to be scanned by a more powerful andmore expensive scanner. Approximately one third of in-bound containertraffic is medium density. This will save money in scanning equipmentand dock delay.

Containers 512 that are represented as containing high density metallicmaterial are directed to high power scanners 512. These scanners canscan the containers for nuclear weapons using, for example, high energyx-ray scanning techniques known in the art. Containers 512 which passthis scan (i.e. if no metal having a density greater than that typicalof medium density cargo is detected) are declared not to contain anuclear weapon.

In some embodiments, containers 508, 510, 512, are secured so that afterscanning the container, a breach through any of its six sides will bedetected (e.g. using a sensor grid embedded in the composite panels ofthe containers of the type described in U.S. Patent Publication No.20070229285 filed Oct. 4, 2007 and entitled “Secure panel with remotelycontrolled embedded devices”). In such a case, it would be feasible toscan containers at some distance from a dock where the containers areloaded onto a ship bound for the United States. As shown in FIG. 10,because containers 508, 510, and 512 can be scanned some distance fromthe dock, it is feasible to provide numerous scanning lanes forcontainer scanning In typical settings, a great number of such lanesmight not be feasible at dockside, where space is limited. Because theneed for expensive high power scanners 506 is limited, numerous scanninglanes having low and medium power scanners 502, 504 may be provided at arelatively low cost.

Further, as described above, analysis of the presence or absence ofdense metal is very simple and requires very little data and very littledata analysis. Consequently, low and medium power scanners 502, 504(and, in some embodiments, even high power scanners 506) may beautomated and/or remotely managed. For example, scanners 502, 504, and506 may be automated using a system analogous to the familiar toll boothautomation systems used on highways. Automated scanning reduces oreliminates the need for on-site operators. This will reduce costs andsecurity risks. For example, it will not be necessary to place trust inan on-site operator. This will be a significant advantage in themaritime shipping environment, which is, unfortunately notoriouslycorrupt in certain venues.

Dosimeter

Referring to FIG. 11, dosimeter 1100 is positioned inside of container1102. Container 1102 has exterior walls 1104 defining an interior volume1106. Exterior walls 1104 may be metal (e.g. steel), composite, or somecombination thereof (e.g. composite panels on a steel frame or steelpanels with embedded composite plugs). Interior volume 1106 may besealed air-tight, such that air does not circulate between the exteriorenvironment and the interior volume.

Dosimeter 1100 includes a boron element 1108 capable of measuring thelevel of radon gas and the neutron level within interior volume 1106.For example, dosimeter 1100 may be a commercial off-the-shelf radondetector. In some embodiments, such an off-the-shelf detector may bemade more sensitive by modifying boron element 1108, using techniquesknown in the art.

As noted above, detection of radon and neutrons is a good indicator offissile material. Substances that do not contain fissile material willtypically not produce radon and neutrons.

When interior volume 1106 of container 1102 is sealed such that the airvolume does not circulate, if dosimeter senses less than a thresholdnumber of neutrons and a threshold radon level over a period of time,the probability that the container contains a nuclear weapon approacheszero. The threshold levels and time periods can be easily determinedbased on measured background neutron and radon levels for a givencontainer type and/or known neutron and radon emission rates for fissilematerial.

In some embodiments, dosimeter 1100 can communicate with devicesexternal to container 1102. For example, referring to FIG. 12, remotecontroller 1200 is in communication (e.g. over an Internet connection)with scanner 1202 and receiver unit 1204 (e.g. a computer) located inproximity to scanner 1202. Scanner 1202 includes beam emitter 1206 whichdirects a radiation beam 1208 (e.g. an x-ray beam) through panel 1104onto beam detector element 1210, which is in communication withdosimeter 1100. Scanner 1202 receives a message from remote control unit1200 and operates to modulate the message onto beam 1208 emitted.Detector 1210 detects beam 1110 and demodulates the message. In responseto the message, dosimeter 1100 outputs information indicating whetherfissile material has been detected inside container 1102. Thisinformation is sent to transmitter 1212 which transmits a responsemessage based on the demodulated message and the information output bydosimeter 1100. The response signal may be sent using a non-directedsignal, for example using a radio broadcast or other wirelesstransmission. As shown, the response message is transmitted over anantenna to a Bluetooth receiver in receiver unit 1204. Receiver unit1204 then passes the message to remote control unit 1200, therebyproviding remote monitoring of container 1102 for fissile material. Insome embodiments, beam 1208 is directed into interior volume 1106through a portion of panels 1104 composed of a material havingrelatively high transmissivity to the radiation beam (e.g. a compositematerial). This allows emitter 1206 to be a relatively low poweredsource, e.g. a low voltage (200 kV or less) x-ray source or a cobalt-60x-ray source.

Note that the above described arrangement provides a closed loop so thata remote monitor can be assured of the position of a particularcontainer while communicating with it. The scan beam 1208 is a directedbeam, which can be used to assure that the container is located in aparticular place, whereas the communication link between transmitter1212 and receiver 1204, e.g. using Bluetooth, is a non-directed wavethat will only locate a container within the Bluetooth range.

This capability of using a communication path consisting of both adirected beam and a non-directed Bluetooth wave would allow a remotemonitor to assure that the container with which it was communicating wasthe container actually being scanned. The ability to assure that aparticular container is in front of the scanner is important to avoidvarious ploys that might be attempted by a clever adversary to avoid thecontainer scanning process. In some embodiments, scanner 1202 andreceiver 1204 may be positioned on or in proximity to loading crane1130. This allows for a positive identification of container 1102 and adetermination that it does not contain a nuclear device immediatelyprior to loading onto a transport (e.g. a maritime container ship,train, truck, etc.). Of course, identification and determination mayadditionally or alternatively be made during or after loading and/orbefore during or after off-loading.

Referring to FIG. 12, in some embodiments, scanner 1202 emits scan beam1208 from emitter 1206 which is directed along a path which enterscontainer 1102 through a first panel 1104A, passes through dosimeter1100, exits container 1102 through a second panel 1104B and is detectedby detector 1300. As described above, a query message (e.g. from aremote control unit) is modulated onto beam 1208. Beam 1208 is detectedby dosimeter 1100 (e.g. either directly using boron element 1108, orusing a separate detector unit), and the message demodulated. Inresponse to the demodulated query, dosimeter 1100 outputs informationindicating whether fissile material has been detected inside container1102. This information is included in a response message modulated ontobeam 1208 by a modulator integral with or in communication withdosimeter 1100. Detector 1300 detects beam 1208 after it exits container1100, and demodulates the response message. Detector 1300 maycommunicate the response message to a remote controller (not shown),e.g., using an Internet link.

Composite Plugs

Referring to FIG. 13, container 100 is constructed from steel panels102, 102A, 102B enclosing an interior volume. Plugs 104 of compositematerial are embedded in side panels 102A and 102B. The composite plugs104 have relatively high transmissivity to x-ray radiation while steelpanels 102, 102A, 102B have relatively low transmissivity. Accordingly,composite plugs 104 act as x-ray “windows” into the interior volume ofcontainer 100.

In the illustrated embodiment, where container 100 is a rectangularparallelpiped, scan beams 110 and their respective emitters 108 anddetectors 112 are along axes parallel to one of the sidewalls ofcontainer 100. In some embodiments, beams 110 and their respectiveemitters 108 and detectors 112 may be angularly offset with respect tothe container sidewall.

Each plug 104 in side panel 102A is located directly opposite to a plug104 in side panel 102B. Scanner 106 includes directed x-ray beamemitters 108. The emitters 108 each direct scan beams 110 through oneplug 104 in sidewall 102A, then through the interior volume of container100, then through another plug 104 on the opposite sidewall 102B and onto a detector 112 outside on the other side of the container. Thedetector signals are transmitted to a remote control unit (not shown),and analyzed to determine the material properties of cargo (not shown)loaded in the interior volume of container 100. For example, thedetector signals can be analyzed to determine the presence of metals,fissile material, medium density material (e.g. electronic components),etc. Because scan beams 110 need not penetrate the steel portions ofside panels 102A, 102B, emitters 108 may be inexpensive, relatively lowpower beam emitters. For example, in various embodiments, emitters 108may be low-voltage x-ray source (e.g. a 200 kV x-ray source) or acobalt-60 x-ray source.

Container 100 can be moved relative to scanner 106 and detectors 112(e.g. by driving a truck hauling the container past scanner 106) toallow scan beams 110 to be directed through additional pairs of plugs toallow other areas of the interior volume to be scanned. Alternatively,scanner 108 and detector 112 may be moved along the length of thecontainer to access different pairs of plugs 104. In some embodiments,container 10 and scanner 108 and detectors 110 remain stationary duringeach scan event. For some applications, e.g. for detecting the presenceof nuclear weapons, a sufficient quantity of plugs 104 are provided suchthat that no matter where the weapon was located within the interior, itcould be detected by the scan.

Composite plugs 104 may be inserted into panels 102A, 102B by anoperation after the steel panel is stamped, or the operation could beintegrated into the stamping operation.

In some embodiments, composite plugs 104 have considerable structuralstrength so that insertion of a plug would not degrade the structuralstrength of the steel container.

In some embodiments, plugs 104 could be retrofitted to an existing steelcontainer 100 at a modest cost so as to overcome the significant costdisadvantage of all—composite containers.

Referring to FIG. 14, in some embodiments, one or more of the compositeplugs 104 located in side panel 102A contain a lens or scatteringelement that directs or scatter the incoming beam 110 to form beams110A, 110B, and 110C, which travel along different paths through theinterior volume of container 100. Each of beams 110A, 110B, and 110Cexit the container through a different composite plug 104 in side panel102B and is detected by a detector 112. Thus, a given input beam 110generates beams 110A, 110B, and 110C which would be detectable by thedetector 112 immediately opposite and by detectors 112 the left andright (and/or above and below depending on the type of lens orscattering element). Accordingly, each scanning beam emitted fromscanner 108 is able to scan a larger portion of the interior volume ofcontainer 100 than in the configuration shown in FIG. 14.

In some embodiments, several inexpensive beam emitters 108 might bearrayed vertically. Opposite these beams, several detectors 112 would bearrayed both horizontally and vertically. In some embodiments beamsources 108 are pulsed sequentially so that the detected pulse could bemeasured separately for each beam pulse. In some such embodiments, itmight be necessary to stop container 100 and scan it while it wasstationary rather than driving the container through a scanner. In someembodiments, indicial markers or position detectors may be used toensure proper alignment of plugs 104 and scanner 106.

Referring to FIG. 15, remote controller 300 is in communication (e.g.over an Internet connection) with scanner 106 and computer 302 locatedin proximity to scanner 106. Scanner 106 operates to modulate a messageon beam 110 emitted by emitter 108. Beam 110 is directed throughcomposite plug 104 into the interior volume of container 100.Detector/demodulator 304 positioned within container 100 detects beam110 and demodulates the message. Transmitter 306 transmits a responsemessage based on the demodulate message, e.g. over an antenna to aBluetooth receiver in computer 302. In some embodiments, other types oftransmission can be used including radio, wireless, etc. The abovedescribed arrangement provides a round trip loop so that a remotemonitor could be assured of the position of a particular container whilecommunicating with it.

In some embodiments, a dosimeter 308 is located inside the container.Dosimeter 308 detects the presence of even shielded fissile material.Dosimeter 308 is in communication with detector/demodulator 304 andtransmitter 306. A query message is sent from remote monitor 300 viamodulated beam 110 through plug 104 to detector/demodulator 304. Inresponse to this massage, information indicating the presence or absenceof fissile material is sent from dosimeter 308 via transmitter 306 tocomputer 302 and on to remote monitor 300. In some such embodiments, asingle composite plug could be inserted into the container allowingcommunication with dosimeter 308 and reducing or eliminating the need toactually scan for metal.

Referring to FIG. 16, wall fabric liner 400 is installed insidecontainer 100 to enclose substantially all of the interior volume of thecontainer. Wall fabric 400 contains grids (e.g. electrical or opticalgrids) that produce an alarm if an intrusion is sensed (e.g. in responseto a breach in a portion in one of the grids). For example, fabric liner200 may include dispersed, interconnected electronic componentsintegrally attached to the liner. Each electronic component of theplurality of components may be in communication with a remotelyaccessible interface and includes a memory for storing a respectivesub-division of at least one numeric value. The numeric values can beinserted, altered, or deleted remotely through the remotely accessibleinterface. Upon detection of an attempted breach of or tamper with fiberliner 400 one or more of the stored sub-divisions are selectivelydestroyed. Detection of an attempted breach or tamper is remotelyobservable upon inspection of a previously stored numeric value,subsequently altered in response to detection of a breach of the securedasset.

Fabric liner 400 has tabs 402 that stick to the panels 102, 102A, 102Bfor easy installation. In some embodiments, the fabric used along thefloor of the container has increased durability, since, in typicalapplications, fork lifts would need to be driven over it.

Composite plugs 104 contain connections for insertion of leads 404 fromthe fabric. These plugs 104 having connections may be installed at ornear the corners of a sidewall of container 100.

When the fabric liner 400 is installed and the connections were madewith plugs 104, a scanner could be used to query fabric liner 400 (e.g.using a closed loop modulation/demodulation/response scheme of the typedescribed above) to assure that the system was functioning properly. Asdescribed above, fabric liner 400 could contain unique embeddedidentification information so that by scanning through the plugs 104 tocommunicate with fabric liner 400, a remote monitor could assure thatthe plugs were connecting to one another through the fabric rather thanthrough some wiring device that avoided the fabric liner 400. Such aconfiguration allows an inexpensive intrusion detection system to beinstalled in steel container 100 and permits a remote check-out that thesystem was providing the required coverage.

In some embodiments, fabric liner 400 is manufactured as an integratedelectrical unit so that a reduced number of wiring connections wouldneed to be made upon installation. In some embodiments, the fabric liner400 is capable of being checked out before installation, so that thetime spent installing a defective fabric can be avoided.

Composite Panels With Intrusion Detection

FIG. 17 is a schematic diagram illustrating an exemplary structuralmember 2100 including a panel 2102. The structural member 2100 includesmultiple electronic components 2104 a, 2104 b, 2104 c, 2104 d, 2104 e(generally 104) distributed throughout the structural member 2100 andattached to the panel 2102. Each of the electronic components 2104 iscoupled to one or more other electronic components 2104 via electricalconnections 2106. Preferably, each of the electronic components 2104 iscoupled to more than one of the other electronic components 2104 topreserve networked interconnection of all active electronic components2104 in the event of one of the electronic component 2104 failing. Insome embodiments, the structural member 2100 includes one or moreinterconnects 2108, each in communication with a respective one of theelectronic components 2104 and adapted for interconnection with similarelectronic components 104 of an adjacent structural member (FIG. 18). Atleast some of the electronic components 104 include a local memory forstoring a respective portion, or sub-division of a numeric value as willbe described in more detail below.

FIG. 18 is a schematic diagram illustrating electrical interconnectionof multiple structural members 100 as may be used for a rectangularcontainer asset, such as a shipping container. Illustrated are left andright panels 2100 a, 2100 b, front, rear, and top panels 2100 c, 2100 d,2100 e, and a bottom panel 2114. In this exemplary embodiment, each ofthe left, right, front, rear, and top panels 2100 a, 2100 b, 2100 c,2100 d, 2100 e (generally) are similar to the structural member 2100 ofFIG. 17. One or more jumpers 2110 are provided to join togethercorresponding electrical interconnects 2108 of adjacent panels 2100.Thus, a shipping container 2112 configured as shown provides a singledispersed, interconnected network of electronic devices 2104.

As shown in more detail in FIG. 19, an exemplary embodiment of one ofthe electronic components 2104 includes a microprocessor 2120, a localpower source 2122, and a local memory 2124. The microprocessor 2120,powered by the local power source 2122, includes a communicationsinterface 2128 that can be used for communicating with other electroniccomponents 2104. The microprocessor 2120 is also in electricalcommunication with the local memory 2124 that can be used to store oneor more numeric values in the form of digital words. As described below,these values can include private and public portions of an ID value 2126a, 2126 b (generally 2126) and private and public portions of acertificate value 2127 a, 2127 b (generally 2127). ID values 2126 can bepreloaded during construction of the structural member 100; whereas, thecertificate values 2127 can be loaded and re-loaded in the field, asrequired.

In operation, the microprocessor 2120 receives one or more of thenumeric values 2126, 2127 over the communications interface 2128 andstores (i.e., writes) them in the local memory 2124. In response to aremote inquiry as to the stored values, the microprocessor 2120 readsthe requested values from local memory 2124 and forwards them to therequester via the communications interface 2128.

Some of the electronic components 2104 are configured to receive aninput from an external sensor. Sensors can be configured detect apotential breach of or attempted unauthorized access to a secured asset.For example, a sensor may include a photo detector to detect a change inambient light as might occur during unauthorized opening of a shippingcontainer. Other sensors are configured to detect a physical breach of acontainer through one or more embedded sensors that might be compromisedif a panel of the container was breached. Still other sensors caninclude thermal sensors, acoustic sensors, shock and vibration sensors,tipping sensors, etc.

As shown, at least some of the electronic components 2104 can include ahigh-energy device 2130 located proximate to the local memory 2124. Thehigh-energy device 2130 can include an incendiary device or a smallexplosive charge (i.e., squib). Upon activation, the high-energy device130 physically destroys at least a significant portion of the localmemory 2124 making it impossible for an adversary to reconstruct datathat may have been stored therein. The high-energy device 2130 receivesan input signal from a tamper sensor 2132. The tamper sensor 2132 may bethe same sensor providing input to the microprocessor 2120, or aseparate sensor 2132 as shown. In some embodiments, two sensors areprovided, such that a first sensor used to delete memory in response toa sensed event and a second sensor is used to physically destroy memoryin response to a sensed event.

In some embodiments, very low power processors 2120 are provided insubstrate layers. Very low power, very small processors are currentlycommercially available, such as the model no. MSP430 series availablefrom Texas Instruments of Dallas, Tex., and the model PIC F10 series,available from Microchip Technology, Inc of Chandler, Ariz., each ofwhich is suitable for being embedded in composite materials inaccordance with the invention. Such very low power processors 2120 aredesigned to run with a power source 2122, such as a permanent battery,for a period of up to ten years, with present device costs starting atabout $0.49, and a current size that is approximately one-tenth the sizeof a penny (4 mm by 4 mm) The size and the cost per unit will probablydecrease significantly in the future.

In some embodiments, the structural member is formed of a compositematerial within which the processors 120 are mounted on a substratelayer. Thus, the composite material replaces standard PVC board on whichelectronic devices are commonly mounted. To achieve this mounting, theprocessors are mounted on a substrate fabric, such as a glass fiber, orother type of layer, to allow a resin to flow through the substrate andbond so as to prevent delamination of the resulting composite material.Using very low power processors 2120, applications can run for up to tenyears from a single lithium battery 2122.

One or more or any part thereof of the control, sensing, detection,scanning or other techniques described above can be implemented incomputer hardware or software, or a combination of both. The methods canbe implemented in computer programs using standard programmingtechniques following the method and figures described herein. Programcode is applied to input data to perform the functions described hereinand generate output information. The output information is applied toone or more output devices such as a display monitor. Each program maybe implemented in a high level procedural or object oriented programminglanguage to communicate with a computer system. However, the programscan be implemented in assembly or machine language, if desired. In anycase, the language can be a compiled or interpreted language. Moreover,the program can run on dedicated integrated circuits preprogrammed forthat purpose.

Each such computer program is preferably stored on a storage medium ordevice (e.g., ROM or magnetic diskette) readable by a general or specialpurpose programmable computer, for configuring and operating thecomputer when the storage media or device is read by the computer toperform the procedures described herein. The computer program can alsoreside in cache or main memory during program execution. The techniquecan also be implemented as a computer-readable storage medium,configured with a computer program, where the storage medium soconfigured causes a computer to operate in a specific and predefinedmanner to perform the functions described herein.

Although in the examples described above container 100 was composed ofrectangular panels (e.g. corrugated rectangular panels), it is to beunderstood that in various embodiments one or more of the panels may becurved and/or have any suitable shape. For example, a tank typecontainer may be made up of a cylindrical panel and two circular end cappanels. Similarly, plugs 104 may be of any suitable shape including, forexample square, rectangular, circular, oval, polygonal, etc. The plugsmay be arranged in any suitable pattern on any number of the panels.

The invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departingfrom the spirit or essential characteristics thereof. The presentembodiments are therefore to be considered in all respects asillustrative and not restrictive, the scope of the invention beingindicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoingdescription, and all changes which come within the meaning and range ofequivalency of the claims are therefore intended to be embraced therein.The Abstract of the Disclosure is provided with the understanding thatit will not be used to interpret or limit the scope or meaning of theclaims. In addition, in the foregoing Detailed Description, it can beseen that various features are grouped together in a single embodimentfor the purpose of streamlining the disclosure. This method ofdisclosure is not to be interpreted as reflecting an intention that theclaimed embodiments require more features than are expressly recited ineach claim. Rather, as the following claims reflect, inventive subjectmatter lies in less than all features of a single disclosed embodiment.Thus the following claims are hereby incorporated into the DetailedDescription, with each claim standing on its own as a separately claimedsubject matter.

What is claimed is:
 1. A container comprising: a plurality of panelsdefining an interior volume of a container, wherein a first panel of theplurality of panels comprises a composite material; a first beamdetector element positioned within the interior volume of the containerto detect an incoming portion of a directed radiation scan beam receivedfrom an external scanner comprising a query message modulated thereonand directed through the composite material of the first panel into theinterior volume, and to demodulate the query message from within theinterior volume of the container, resulting in a demodulated querymessage; a security element positioned within the interior volume of thecontainer to detect an intrusion into the interior volume of thecontainer; an identification element positioned within the interiorvolume of the container, communicatively coupled to the security elementand the first beam detector element to store identification information,resulting in stored identification information indicative of an identityof the container, and to produce a response message from within theinterior volume of the container based on the demodulated query message,the stored identification information and information received from thesecurity element without breaking a seal of the container when sealed;and a transmitter element positioned within the interior volume of thecontainer and communicatively coupled to the identification element totransmit the response message to an external receiver unit, wherein theresponse is modulated onto an outgoing portion of the directed radiationscan beam passing to the external receiver unit through the compositematerial of the first panel of the plurality of panels.
 2. The containerof claim 1, wherein the incoming portion of the directed scan beam andthe outgoing portion of the directed scan beam are implemented by meansof a radio frequency identification transponder.
 3. The container ofclaim 1, wherein the identification element produces a response messageallowing the identity of the container to be verified based on theresponse message.
 4. The container of claim 3, wherein the query messageincludes a randomly generated number.
 5. The container of claim 1,wherein the external scanner determines, from the response sent by thecontainer over a communication channel, one or more material propertiesof the container, the external scanner inferring from the materialproperties one of a presence of a nuclear device, an absence of thenuclear device or another security condition, wherein the externalscanner in response to inferring the one of the presence of the nucleardevice, the absence of the nuclear device or the other securitycondition, providing one or more numeric values, wherein the one or morenumeric values include values associated with the identity of thecontainer, the values being transmitted over the communications channeland stored by the container in the interior volume of the containerwithout breaking the seal, the one or more numeric values responsive tobeing queried by another scanner, allowing a determination to be madewhether any of the one or more numeric values have been altered and, andsupporting an inference of a security risk based on the determination.6. The container of claim 5, further comprising a second panel of theplurality of panels comprising a composite material, wherein theoutgoing portion of the directed radiation scan beam exits the containerthrough the composite material of the second panel and is directed ontoan external second beam detector element, resulting in a second detectedscan beam.
 7. The container of claim 6, further comprising: a dosimeterpositioned within the interior volume of the container, the dosimetercomprising: a radon detection element to detect a radon level for theinterior volume; and a neutron detection element to detect a neutronlevel for the interior volume, wherein the dosimeter measures the radonlevel and neutron level, resulting in a measured radon level and ameasured neutron level, for a period of time, compares the measuredradon level to a first threshold and compares the measured neutron levelto a second threshold, resulting in further comparisons, determinesdosimeter information indicative of the presence or absence of fissilematerial within the interior volume based on the further comparisons,and communicates the dosimeter information to one of the identificationelement, the transmitter element, the first beam detector element, thesecond beam detector element, or a combination thereof.
 8. The containerof claim 7, wherein the container comprises a sealed container having asubstantially air tight interior volume, and wherein the securityelement comprises a radon detector unit performing operationscomprising: detecting a change in radon level, resulting in a detectedchange, in the interior volume of the sealed container; comparing thedetected change to an expected change value based on a half-life ofradon; and indicating the presence or absence of an intrusion into thesealed container based on the comparing of the detected change to theexpected change value.
 9. The container of claim 5, wherein theidentification element irrecoverably alters a portion of the storedidentification information in response to one of an intrusion detectedby the security element or another detected condition, thereby changinga state of the container such the container cannot thereafter berestored the state prior to detection of the intrusion or othercondition
 10. The container of claim 6, wherein the first panelcomprises a first plurality of plugs of composite material positionedwithin apertures through a first metal wall, wherein the second panelcomprises a second plurality of plugs of composite material positionedwithin apertures through a second metal wall, wherein a path of thedirected radiation scan beam along the interior volume extends through afirst plug of the first plurality of plugs and a second plug of thesecond plurality of plugs, a separation distance between the first andsecond plugs spanning the interior volume of the container.
 11. Thecontainer of claim 5, wherein the identification element storesidentification information which cannot be transmitted to any scanner orreceiver located outside the container.
 12. The container of claim 5,wherein the security element comprises a sensor grid embedded in apartially composite panel of the plurality of at least partiallycomposite panels.
 13. A method, comprising: storing uniqueidentification information and other values to obtain stored informationin an identification element within an interior volume of a sealedcontainer, the interior volume being defined by a plurality of panels, afirst panel of the plurality of panels comprising a composite material;detecting from within the interior volume of the container, a scan beamoriginating externally from the interior volume of the container andoperating according to a predefined protocol and directed into theinterior volume of the sealed container through the composite materialof the first panel, without breaching a seal of the sealed container,remotely identifying the container in response to the detecting of thescan beam based on the unique identity information; without breachingthe seal of the sealed container, determining in response to thedetecting of the scan beam one of a presence of a nuclear weapon or anabsence of a nuclear weapon within the interior volume; and altering thestored information to obtain altered stored information based on thedetermination, wherein a remote monitor can identify a dangerouscondition based on the altered stored information.
 14. The method ofclaim 13, further comprising receiving the unique identificationinformation originating at a secure trusted location, wherein the uniqueidentification information comprises one of a public key, a private key,a random number, or a combination thereof wherein a copy of at least aportion of the one of the public key, the private key the random number,or the combinations thereof is stored in a remote monitor unit.
 15. Themethod of claim 14, wherein the remote monitor unit is at a firstlocation, the remote monitor unit in communication with a scanning unitat a second location to communicate with the identification elementwithin the container without breaching the seal of the container, queryinformation generated at the remote monitor unit transmitted to theremote scanning unit, the query information being received by anidentification unit from the remote monitor; applying a hash algorithmat the identification unit to at least some of the query informationwith some or all of information stored in the container and optionallyinformation developed by the container to produce response hashinformation; and in response to the query information, without breachingthe seal of the container, transmitting the response information to thescanning unit, wherein the remote monitor unit, according to thepredefined protocol, is able to: identify elements of the informationreceived from the scanning unit; apply the hash algorithm to theelements of the information to produce verification hash information;and compare the response hash information to the verification hashinformation to verify one of an identity of the container, anothercondition within the container, or both.
 16. The method of claim 15,further comprising, detecting one of an intrusion of the container, anuclear weapon, or another security breach, and in response to thedetecting of the one of the intrusion of the container, the nuclearweapon or the another security breach, one of modifying or destroying aportion of the stored information.
 17. The method of claim 13, whereinthe scan beam comprises a directed radiation scan beam having a beamenergy sufficient to penetrate through the composite material of thefirst panel but insufficient to penetrate through bulk metal material,wherein the directed radiation scan beam is detectable by a detectorunit positioned external to the interior volume, resulting in a detectedradiation scan beam having transited a portion of the interior volume,exiting the interior volume through a second panel of the pluralitypanels, the second panel comprising a composite material, whereininformation indicative of material properties of contents of theinterior volume is determinable based on the detected radiation scanbeam.
 18. The method of claim 13, further comprising measuring, by adosimeter positioned within the interior volume of the sealed container,one of a radon level, a neutron level or both in the interior volumeover a period of time, resulting in one of a measured radon level, ameasured neutron level or both; detecting a presence or absence offissile material within the interior volume based on the measured radonlevel, the measured neutron level or both; and in response to detectinga presence of fissile material, altering a portion of the identificationinformation stored in the identification element.
 19. The method ofclaim 13, further comprising: monitoring the container for an indicationof an imminent nuclear explosion, and in response to a detection of animminent nuclear explosion, transmitting a message comprisinginformation indicative of the identity of the container.
 20. A system,comprising: a processor; and a memory to store executable instructionsthat, when executed by the processor, facilitate performance ofoperations, comprising: detecting from within an interior volume of asealed container, a directed radiation scan beam originating externallyfrom the interior volume of the sealed container and directed into theinterior volume of the sealed container through composite material of afirst panel of a plurality of panels defining the interior volume,without breaching a seal of the sealed container, remotely identifyingthe sealed container in response to the detecting of the directedradiation scan beam based on unique identity information stored in anidentification element within the interior volume of the sealedcontainer; without breaching a seal of the sealed container, determininga presence or absence of a nuclear weapon within the interior volume;and generating a signal to allow information associated with theidentity of the sealed container to be stored in a remote monitor unitbased on determining an absence of a nuclear weapon within the interiorvolume.